Crisis Group interview, businessperson, Brussels, September Plans have come up against regional rivalries within the former province, however, with business elites in Kolwesi and Lubumbashi backing rival road corridors. Simmering disputes over transport links, vitally important given the money to be made from mineral transport, reflect the high stakes involved in delimiting new provinces and hurt the business climate, adding further insecurities to the economic challenges.
There is a growing political dimension to the economic frustrations felt by Katangan elites and population that feeds into tensions with the centre. Local elites, especially Lubakat, grumble about receiving too little attention. Hide Footnote They say control in Kinshasa would quell or harness dormant but real Katangan separatism. In past months, the majority has invested considerable attention on the four new provinces.
The regime has reached out to provinces and elites beyond Katanga, both to reward them for having voted for Kabila in and to achieve better geographical balance. Ponyo is one of three PPRD politicians competing to lead the majority and possibly succeed the president. Katangans note that none are from their province but may take some solace from the installation of Henri Mova Sakanyi as PPRD secretary general.
Mova Sakanyi was ambassador in Brussels, These disputes between Katanga and the centre have played into schisms in the majority over the last year. The final letter, sealing the split, called for respect of constitutional deadlines, essentially a demand that Kabila step down in December.
Some of these political frustrations have spilled onto the street. Armed groups have recently been active in Katanga, though they do not have overt political platforms, and their generally low-profile operations are not as extensive as those in the Kivus.
In some cases, their activities are probably linked to the elite frustrations outlined above and the secessionist sentiments they feed. It claims to defend the region against exploitation by Kinshasa and reportedly has ties with small secessionist organisations.
He was sentenced to death in the DRC has a moratorium on the death penalty. He escaped in an outbreak of 1, prisoners in Lubumbashi in Hide Footnote It was particularly active in , when, in March, many of its fighters marched into Lubumbashi. Several well-placed sources and local leaders in Katanga believe the group serves the interests of political and economic elites at the national and provincial levels.
UN Experts, op. Violence could flare up unexpectedly and exacerbate humanitarian problems. The security challenges were compounded by difficult logistics, due to the lack of infrastructure, the fallout of the economic crisis affecting numerous workers and the dire humanitarian situation. Hide Footnote Dozens of Bakata Katanga have surrendered, giving up weapons.
However, few in Lubumbashi believe the group has been defeated; there is fear some politicians keep it in readiness for possible future need. Crisis Group email correspondence, Lubumbashi-based analyst, October These are not the only armed groups that should be a concern. On 30 December , followers of the self-proclaimed prophet Mukungubila from the same area as Kabila and an unsuccessful candidate in the election attacked the state TV station RTNC , the defence ministry and the national airport, all in Kinshasa.
Reportedly several hundred followers were killed, most in Lubumbashi. Though the motivation of the attacks is still not entirely clear, they illustrate the potential consequences of unaddressed tensions between Katanga and the centre and between Katangan elites.
Many observers believe they were an attempt by Lubakat elite to pressure the president and secure their positions in the government and security forces. Mukungubila published a letter to Kabila on 5 December attacking his decision to name General Charles Bisengimana Rukira to head the PNC, denouncing Rukira for his supposed Rwandan origins and calling on security services to remove the president.
Katumbi expressed support for the president. Hide Footnote The failure to address the Bakata Katanga, the opaque nature of the Mukungubila affair and recent accusations against politicians of recruiting or harbouring a militia all point to the continued role of unaccountable armed elements in uncertain political times.
When Mobutu was overthrown in , he went into exile in Zambia, where he was close to the then President Frederick Chiluba and successful in business, especially transport. Katumbi became a Kabila supporter on his return and was elected Katanga governor in by the votes of 94 of the members in the new provincial assembly. Hide Footnote He is an atypical Congolese politician, whose private business fortune, from fisheries, mining and transport, gives him an exceptional degree of independence from the central government.
Katumbi is a charismatic populist and generally credited with a good record as governor. Omasombo, Biographie , op. Close media connections are relatively common for politicians. The presidential family has interests in Digitalcongo, and several other Katangan political leaders own or are close to a TV station. Hide Footnote These, along with a hands-on style, have made him well-known and popular, in Katanga and beyond.
Because the government delayed provincial elections, he was governor for eight years instead of the mandated five. Hide Footnote His tenure coincided with and benefited from the commodity boom, which led to significant infrastructure development in southern Katanga that contrasted, however, with the lack of development elsewhere in the province see above. Over the years, the relationship between the charismatic Katumbi and the more introverted Kabila became increasingly difficult.
In the run-up to the elections, a seemingly disillusioned Katumbi announced he would leave politics. But civil society organisations collected a million signatures on a petition imploring Katumbi to stay. A supporting rally a few weeks before the elections also highlighted the strong Katumbi-Kyungu alliance. Tensions between Katangan leaders and the president escalated dramatically in late when Katumbi, Kyungu and Jean-Claude Muyambo separately took strong public positions against any constitutional amendment that would allow Kabila to stand for a third term.
Muyambo was subsequently imprisoned, officially for an unrelated matter. Muyambo, formerly a Katumbi foe, was president of the Bemba association Sempya , humanitarian affairs minister and president of the Lubumbashi Bar Association. For more, see Crisis Group Report, Congo , op. Muyambo was imprisoned in January and is still in jail. Kabila reacted during a meeting with the Katangan elite in January , from which Katumbi, Kyungu and Muyambo were absent.
Further signs of deteriorating relations came in summer In June, the government reportedly transferred a general file on corruption to the national prosecutor with suggestions that it implicated Katumbi. This was later denied by the prosecutor, and the president appears to have backed away from levelling corruption allegations for now.
Preparing for his new position as a Kabila opponent and with one eye on future elections, Katumbi reached out to international actors and other opposition politicians, including Kamerhe and Tshisekedi. Katumbi reportedly hired a U. The idea was resisted by other opposition parties, fearful of his wealth and influence. They focused more on guaranteeing credible elections than who would contest them.
Hide Footnote Since he left the majority, Katumbi has been close to the G7, and several other groups and parties have rallied to him. On 30 March , the G7 formally asked Katumbi to be a presidential candidate. Hide Footnote Realising that his attempt to inspire broader opposition unity had not worked, Katumbi declared his desire to stand on 4 May.
On the same day, Justice Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba announced an investigation into Katumbi for allegedly employing mercenaries. On June, some Congolese opposition politicians and civil society representatives met in Genval, Belgium. Katumbi was absent, but several close advisers and his brother, Katebe Katoto, attended.
It allows Katumbi to operate in close association to the historic opposition leader. The defections of Katumbi and the G7 have considerably weakened the majority in Katanga and especially Lubumbashi, where it has never had to contend with serious opposition.
In early April, the army paraded tanks and armoured vehicles in Lubumbashi. Hide Footnote The central government and PPRD have also reinvigorated attempts to retain support in Katanga, including by encouraging new parties, or factions within existing parties.
However Kyungu was able to produce court documents on 5 February that confirmed his leadership of the party. This campaign included issuing new membership cards to PPRD ministers and deputies. Both Kabila and Katumbi are mobilising and broadening their support. Crisis Group email correspondence, Katangan analyst, August Demonstrations and violence escalated in April and May , when the government accused Katumbi of endangering national security. He was injured in a protest outside the Lubumbashi courthouse and eventually flew abroad for medical treatment, an avoidance of all-out confrontation that may have suited both sides.
He was subsequently convicted in a civil dispute over ownership of property, but the ruling and three-year prison sentence can be challenged, because he was convicted in absentia. Hide Footnote Nevertheless, the government has strong cards to play and is likely to continue to bring legal cases to keep him on the defensive. The population of Katanga and other opposition parties have stayed quiet through this round of confrontation, but no one thinks the problems have been resolved.
Katumbi does not have old links to armed groups, so the high level of political tension is not linked to the outbreaks of armed violence described above, though some of his allies, in particular UNAFEC, could be involved in street clashes. The fundamental breakdown of trust between Kinshasa and many Katangan elite and ordinary citizens reflects countrywide discontent with the regime as it tries to delay elections in ever more inventive ways.
It also reveals very Katangan concerns about identity, power and entitlement. Necessary legislation for the effective functioning and budgetary survival of the new provinces has stalled. In October , the government froze transfer of national tax revenue to the provinces and other decentralised entities and announced an audit of all provincial budgets, which may take a long time and create further crises.
All this adds to a growing feeling that decentralisation gains and Katangan identity more widely are under attack. The breakdown in trust and rising tensions risk triggering violent escalation. The concerns are at local, provincial and national levels. The most significant danger arises when the various tensions feed off each other, as appears to have happened with the Mukungubila incident that triggered violence in both Kinshasa and Katanga.
An indication that the government is worried about such dynamics is the increased military presence in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces. Particularly telling are the deployment of armoured vehicles near Lubumbashi and reinforcements in Kolwezi. As the electoral deadline looms, government and opposition are increasingly focused on their fight to take or retain power and adopting a zero-sum approach. Real dialogue and government commitment not to manipulate the constitution for political purposes would contribute to de-escalating tensions across the country.
This situation is hardly promising for solving problems at local level, but it makes finding a way forward ever more important. These are most likely when local and provincial elections are organised. Responsible leadership is needed from cultural and community leaders and authorities. At the least, national authorities must allow space for local reconciliation initiatives and not take actions that might exacerbate problems.
Politicians on all sides must desist from politicising identity to shore up support bases. The approaching elections necessitate further local action to deal with armed groups. Use of such groups to further political ambitions continues, in Katanga as well as the worse affected Kivus, despite fourteen years of official peace.
However, while there has been some serious violence in Katanga over the last five years, and there is reason to believe the armed groups remain a threat, the frequency and intensity of incidents do not yet indicate an explosive situation. Where possible, disarmament and demobilisation should be carried out, though this needs to be carefully considered and done case by case, so as to not inflame tensions or create perceptions that some communities are being unfairly treated.
Its presence in Katanga, though limited, is being beefed-up to deal with a possible upsurge in violence if political tensions continue to rise. While there are limits to what it can do when national forces confront their own citizens, MONUSCO should continue reinforcing its police component in urban centres, to help with monitoring Congolese police and military in case of urban unrest and to provide security for political officers and human rights monitors.
The Mission is reviewing its military and police deployments in areas at high risk of election-related violence and enhancing its ability to protect UN personnel in urban centres, including Lubumbashi, by developing evacuation plans and deploying helicopters and armoured personnel carriers.
Rising political tensions in Katanga and the country at large coincide with a slump in the mineral export dependent economy. Major export prices are not expected to increase in the near future, leaving little margin to raise revenue other than by tackling corruption and increasing efficiency, but as political competition is patronage based, there is an ever more desperate fight over a shrinking cake.
It also dispels hope of quickly operationalising the equalisation fund, so the disparities between provinces will remain. Crisis Group interview, development official, Kinshasa, March After ten years of tentative decentralisation, which at least shifted some power to provincial assemblies and administrations, recent moves by Kinshasa have reversed the trend.
Foreshadowing its probable approach in national elections, the majority has deployed all means at its disposal to ensure that nearly all provincial authorities are subject to its command.
It is vital that the government makes the province-centre financial relationship far more transparent. This should be in conjunction with a financial monitoring mechanism, so that decentralisation does not simply equate to decentralisation of corruption. A more empowered audit office, with better civil society monitoring of financial flows, could help defuse province-centre tensions.
Again, the national political climate does not currently lend itself to such progress, but these issues should not be ignored if a better balance is to be found.
Katanga, because of regime ties and its disproportionate economic weight, is one of the key battlegrounds, along with major urban centres such as Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani. The lack of effective development, in particular in its north, and competing individual ambitions have pushed the Katangan elite into a dangerously polarised position.
With resources distributed along patronage networks, it is determined to either keep a grip on central power a determination potentially at odds with national democracy or keep more resources at the provincial level. Support for Katangan identity is not inherently illegitimate, and prospect of a strong separatist movement is currently remote, but the risk is that politicians will mobilise armed groups and networks to manipulate separatist sentiment for their political ends.
Several provincial political leaders have rallied to his camp, but Kabila retains strong Lubakat support, as well as a base in the new Lualaba province.
Whether Katumbi and Kabila will ever contest an election head to head depends on future turns in the unfolding political drama, but if events since Katumbi announced his candidacy are an indication, the battle would be hard fought.
Even now, the confrontation is likely to raise tensions, not just between province and centre, which are connected by multiple overlapping networks, but also by shifting elite alliances. To move the electoral, financial and political issues forward constructively and put in place transitional arrangements for the now inevitable delay of the November polls requires a minimum of trust between the main parties, a more coherent opposition and a step away from winner takes all politics.
Hide Footnote Genuine, credible dialogue is needed, which should include but not be limited to a formal national dialogue. As elsewhere in the vast country, the risks of unpredictable deterioration and renewed violence are real in Katanga. Now is the time to head them off.
Though the government will try hard to keep the international community out of its relations with the new provinces, mediation efforts to bring the main parties in political disputes together should keep the subject on the table. For more information, please see Our Supporters. For a full print version of this report with a list of supporters, please apply to brussels crisisgroup. The U. Crisis Group analyses the implications. Which armed groups did the U. Last week the U.
They recruit mainly local fighters. Having developed tactical alliances with both senior army officers and armed groups fighting security forces, it both fuels and feeds off an internecine and murky conflict on the ground. In Mozambique, ASWJ formed when frustrated youth, including local petty traders and poor fishermen, began building their own mosques and prayer houses in Cabo Delgado province and challenging established religious leaders they saw as too close to state authorities.
As the police clamped down, they eventually took up arms, launching their first attack in There is some evidence of prior contacts between the two designated groups. Local observers and officials in the DRC and Mozambique say that there are some known cases of Mozambicans, including some of the leaders of ASWJ, travelling to the DRC for training, but these movements are believed to have ended years ago. Both the ADF and ASWJ have grown more dangerous over the years, becoming increasingly bold in their attacks against security forces while inflicting terrible violence against civilians.
The ADF, long dormant in the DRC, first began resurfacing again in , mainly committing atrocities against civilians in gruesome machete attacks. From , the group then began turning its attention increasingly against government security forces and UN peacekeepers.
Its operations became more sophisticated and used greater firepower. Some elements have moved east to the foothills of the Rwenzori mountains bordering Uganda, and some north into neighbouring Ituri province, where they have been involved in reported killings.
In Mozambique, ASWJ has become significantly more dangerous and sophisticated since it first started up in In the early stages of the insurgency, attackers grouped in small packs of a few fighters to attack remote police outposts or villages, often brandishing blunt weapons. But by early , the insurgents had taken significant stockpiles of weapons from government security forces and were able to mount attacks on district capitals, including the port of Mocimboa da Praia.
Government forces fled the city in August and have yet to retake it. Violence against civilians also escalated over the past year, as the insurgency swept south towards the provincial capital Pemba, with numerous credible reports of atrocities committed by ASWJ fighters. In recent months, security forces working with foreign military contractors from South Africa have caused the group some setbacks, destroying some of their camps and storage facilities in the bush.
Nevertheless, insurgents continue to regroup and mount guerrilla attacks on security forces, while also plundering villages for food. Some worry that they will face the kind of attacks that Kenya has seen in recent years in Nairobi, or that Uganda saw in Kampala in South Africa also shows signs of being worried about militant groups, including those from the Great Lakes region and Mozambique, using its territory as a base or safe haven, and about possible links between home-grown militants in South Africa and those in the DRC and Mozambique.
Similarly, while there is evidence that ISIS has had some contact with jihadists in Mozambique, it is unclear how close or meaningful their ties are. Regional security sources say he is a trainer and a bomb-maker. While ASWJ attacks did become more sophisticated in , the group has yet to show evidence of explosive device capacities.
In addition, communication between the groups and some coordination in disseminating propaganda does not suggest especially close links. The biggest cohort of foreigners fighting within the ranks of ASWJ, according to government officials, regional security sources and eyewitnesses interviewed by Crisis Group, are from Tanzania.
Many of them appear to be acolytes of Aboud Rogo , a former Kenyan cleric who was linked to both al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and who was assassinated in Abu Yasir Hassan, whom the U. What will be the effect of these designations and how might authorities in the DRC and Mozambique manage the fallout? Among other things, the terrorism listings freeze all of the assets under U.
While the sanctions that flow from these designations in theory do not criminalise all contact with the two groups, they are extremely broad, and their implementation could create problems for both humanitarians and peacemakers. Humanitarian agencies may shrink from providing support to vulnerable populations in Mozambique and the DRC if they believe they might end up resourcing someone who could later be accused of being an ADF or ASWJ member.
Government or UN officials who might want to put resources into the hands of insurgents or fighters in order to, for example, transport them to a forum for peace negotiations, could technically also fall foul of the material support restrictions that flow from the designations. Nor is there much likelihood that the designations will lead to a quick dismantling of these armed groups, which manage much of their money in cash or via forms of money transfer that will require painstaking work to investigate and chase, and may put them beyond the reach of U.
Especially in the DRC and Mozambique, where these measures are not fully understood even by top policymakers, they could be used by hardliners to justify calls for addressing the challenge posed by the ADF and ASWJ through military action alone. Diplomats in the region also now wonder whether the official unveiling of a U. So far, however, the Mozambican government has signalled very clearly it does not want any foreign boots touching the soil of Cabo Delgado.
Military operations in the DRC and Mozambique have recently dented both groups, but tackling the threat they pose will require a broader approach, including efforts to appeal to the Congolese and Mozambican citizens who respectively make up the bulk of fighters in both groups. This site uses cookies.
By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details. Andes Central America. Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U. War on Terror. Introduction: The National Context. In this podcast, Crisis Group's Richard Moncrieff discusses the links between long-term tensions in the Katanga region and the crisis in DRC linked to the constitutional and electoral deadline at the end of Loading Video.
Related Tags Democratic Republic of Congo. Also available in English. Up Next. Women wait in line during a World Food Program distribution at a school in Matuge district in northern Mozambique, 24 February Dino Mahtani. Nelleke van de Walle. Piers Pigou. Meron Elias. Yes, I Agree. It has been efficient in dealing with similar militia in the Ituri district, where 14, combatants have been demobilised, and the Katanga militias are not as well armed or organised. However, the minimal reinforcement — an strong battalion — authorised in late by the Security Council for the province is insufficient.
The 2,strong brigade asked for by the Secretary-General is needed. In Katanga, as elsewhere in the country, bad governance and impunity are closely linked to violence. Officials use parallel chains of command in the army and administration to protect their interests and embezzle state funds. The justice sector is too weak and politicised to curb these excesses.
Current levels of corruption and abuse of power are themselves sources of instability that threaten the transition and could compromise elections, while discontented politicians are likely to take advantage of the weak state to stir up trouble and contest election results.
Donors should take a firmer stance now on corruption and impunity. Their aid — over half the present national budget — gives leverage to impose stricter supervision of funds, like what is being attempted in Liberia. They should also give more support to Congolese institutions charged with good governance that are trying to curb corruption, such as courts and parliamentary commissions. The U. Crisis Group analyses the implications. Which armed groups did the U.
Last week the U. They recruit mainly local fighters. Having developed tactical alliances with both senior army officers and armed groups fighting security forces, it both fuels and feeds off an internecine and murky conflict on the ground. In Mozambique, ASWJ formed when frustrated youth, including local petty traders and poor fishermen, began building their own mosques and prayer houses in Cabo Delgado province and challenging established religious leaders they saw as too close to state authorities.
As the police clamped down, they eventually took up arms, launching their first attack in There is some evidence of prior contacts between the two designated groups. Local observers and officials in the DRC and Mozambique say that there are some known cases of Mozambicans, including some of the leaders of ASWJ, travelling to the DRC for training, but these movements are believed to have ended years ago. Both the ADF and ASWJ have grown more dangerous over the years, becoming increasingly bold in their attacks against security forces while inflicting terrible violence against civilians.
The ADF, long dormant in the DRC, first began resurfacing again in , mainly committing atrocities against civilians in gruesome machete attacks. From , the group then began turning its attention increasingly against government security forces and UN peacekeepers. Its operations became more sophisticated and used greater firepower.
Some elements have moved east to the foothills of the Rwenzori mountains bordering Uganda, and some north into neighbouring Ituri province, where they have been involved in reported killings.
In Mozambique, ASWJ has become significantly more dangerous and sophisticated since it first started up in In the early stages of the insurgency, attackers grouped in small packs of a few fighters to attack remote police outposts or villages, often brandishing blunt weapons.
But by early , the insurgents had taken significant stockpiles of weapons from government security forces and were able to mount attacks on district capitals, including the port of Mocimboa da Praia. Government forces fled the city in August and have yet to retake it. Violence against civilians also escalated over the past year, as the insurgency swept south towards the provincial capital Pemba, with numerous credible reports of atrocities committed by ASWJ fighters.
In recent months, security forces working with foreign military contractors from South Africa have caused the group some setbacks, destroying some of their camps and storage facilities in the bush. Nevertheless, insurgents continue to regroup and mount guerrilla attacks on security forces, while also plundering villages for food.
Some worry that they will face the kind of attacks that Kenya has seen in recent years in Nairobi, or that Uganda saw in Kampala in South Africa also shows signs of being worried about militant groups, including those from the Great Lakes region and Mozambique, using its territory as a base or safe haven, and about possible links between home-grown militants in South Africa and those in the DRC and Mozambique.
Similarly, while there is evidence that ISIS has had some contact with jihadists in Mozambique, it is unclear how close or meaningful their ties are. Regional security sources say he is a trainer and a bomb-maker. While ASWJ attacks did become more sophisticated in , the group has yet to show evidence of explosive device capacities.
In addition, communication between the groups and some coordination in disseminating propaganda does not suggest especially close links. The biggest cohort of foreigners fighting within the ranks of ASWJ, according to government officials, regional security sources and eyewitnesses interviewed by Crisis Group, are from Tanzania. Many of them appear to be acolytes of Aboud Rogo , a former Kenyan cleric who was linked to both al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and who was assassinated in Abu Yasir Hassan, whom the U.
What will be the effect of these designations and how might authorities in the DRC and Mozambique manage the fallout? Among other things, the terrorism listings freeze all of the assets under U. While the sanctions that flow from these designations in theory do not criminalise all contact with the two groups, they are extremely broad, and their implementation could create problems for both humanitarians and peacemakers.
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